سخنرانی ماهیانه
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رویکرد اصل موضوعی به مسألهی تقسیم شانس
رسول رمضانیان (Senior SNFS Researcher, University of Lausanne)
چکیده
We explore matching problems in situations where agents' preferences are represented by ideal lotteries. We discuss axioms such as strategy proofness, replacement monotonicity, (Pareto) efficiency, in-betweenness, non-bossiness, envy-freeness, and anonymity in the context of dividing chances, and propose a class of mechanisms called URC mechanisms that satisfy these axioms. Subsequently, we prove that if a mechanism for dividing chances is strategy proof, (Pareto) efficient, replacement monotonic, in-between, non-bossy, and anonymous (or envy free), then it is equivalent in terms of welfare to a URC mechanism.
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