Monthly Lecture

In collaboration with the Department of Mathematics, University of Qom

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An Axiomatic Approach to the Problem of Dividing Chances

Rasoul Ramezanian (Senior SNFS Researcher, University of Lausanne)

Abstract

We explore matching problems in situations where agents' preferences are represented by ideal lotteries. We discuss axioms such as strategy proofness, replacement monotonicity, (Pareto) efficiency, in-betweenness, non-bossiness, envy-freeness, and anonymity in the context of dividing chances, and propose a class of mechanisms called URC mechanisms that satisfy these axioms. Subsequently, we prove that if a mechanism for dividing chances is strategy proof, (Pareto) efficient, replacement monotonic, in-between, non-bossy, and anonymous (or envy free), then it is equivalent in terms of welfare to a URC mechanism.

Date: Monday, 15 April 2024

Time: 16:00–18:00 (Tehran time)

Format: Online

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