Monthly Lecture
In collaboration with the Department of Mathematics, University of Qom
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An Axiomatic Approach to the Problem of Dividing Chances
Rasoul Ramezanian (Senior SNFS Researcher, University of Lausanne)
Abstract
We explore matching problems in situations where agents' preferences are represented by ideal lotteries. We discuss axioms such as strategy proofness, replacement monotonicity, (Pareto) efficiency, in-betweenness, non-bossiness, envy-freeness, and anonymity in the context of dividing chances, and propose a class of mechanisms called URC mechanisms that satisfy these axioms. Subsequently, we prove that if a mechanism for dividing chances is strategy proof, (Pareto) efficient, replacement monotonic, in-between, non-bossy, and anonymous (or envy free), then it is equivalent in terms of welfare to a URC mechanism.
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