رویکرد اصل موضوعی به مسألهی تقسیم شانس
سخنران: رسول رمضانیان (Senior SNFS Researcher - University of Lausanne)
دوشنبه 27 فروردین 1403، ساعت 16 الی 18
Abstract:
We explore matching problems in situations where agents' preferences are represented by ideal lotteries. We discuss axioms such as strategy proofness, replacement monotonicity, (Pareto) efficiency, in-betweenness, non-bossiness, envy-freeness, and anonymity in the context of dividing chances, and propose a class of mechanisms called URC mechanisms that satisfy these axioms. Subsequently, we prove that if a mechanism for dividing chances is strategy proof, (Pareto) efficient, replacement monotonic, in-between, non-bossy, and anonymous (or envy free), then it is equivalent in terms of welfare to a URC mechanism.
سخنرانی به صورت مجازی و به میزبانی گروه ریاضی دانشگاه قم و انجمن منطق ایران برگزار خواهد شد.
پیوند سخنرانی برخط (آنلاین): 🔗 https://www.skyroom.online/ch/ialogic/ialogic